Woe, Jeremy Corbyn?
Of course, matters at the moment are less than ideal. If history was guided by reason, the Tory vote would have splintered under the impact of their Brexit crisis while Labour enjoys a commanding lead, comfortably ahead thanks to the powerful coalition of voters built at the last general election. But because we don't inhabit a fantasy world, criticisms of Corbyn - of which Behr and Toynbee's are typical - take issue with the fact we don't. Sometimes, you could be forgiven for thinking the only people who believe the magic grandpa stuff are his detractors. Meanwhile, the vote shares of the main parties have collapsed and politics resembles something like the first round of French presidential elections, with four viable contenders duking it out. The question is could Labour have avoided this by moving its Brexit position?
Possibly. There is a conspiracy theory in some centrist and left wing circles that Corbyn is either a secret Brexiteer, or is imprisoned by a shadowy cabal of lexit-loving Stalinists. If they didn't have any influence then all would be good. As here as per all conspiracy theories, reality is somewhat more complex. The two stubborn facts that just won't go away are a) remain lost the EU referendum and, by a narrow margin, the electorate voted to leave, b) a third of Labour's support Brexit. The conclusion flowing from this is since socialism and democracy are inseparable, setting aside the referendum result is anti-democratic and can store up big trouble for political legitimacy later on. The position of Corbynism in government when it faces the inevitable opposition from capital is more secure if democracy is on its side. Therefore the reason why Labour's default position is for a Brexit deal is principled and practical, and would also be the case if someone else was leading the party right now, whether they were planning on a transformative programme or the tepid miserablism of meagre amelioration. Labour, like all parties, make certain adaptations to political realities: there's no need for idiotic conspiracism to explain its positioning.
And so there has been a change and Labour's position has shifted. This year Corbyn has either sponsored or supported four Commons votes on avoiding no deal, avoiding May's damaging deal, and backing a final say referendum on any deal. Either the leadership are trying very hard to conceal their Lexit preferences, or their position is shifting as the facts change. However, the reason why we're at this four-party impasse is because of an over stress on the politics of 2017 - that were possible because Brexit was temporarily negated as an issue - were found wanting once the Brexit process entered its most acute, crisis phase. We entered the EU elections as if we were approaching a general election. The responsibility for this lies with the leadership, but the reason why it failed has a number of other authors.
Back in October, I got some stick for suggesting the so-called People's Vote marches constituted a bourgeois social movement. Not because they were "inauthentic" or astroturf, but because they were organised and run by elites who determined the speakers and the political colouration of the campaign. Seriously, who but a Westminster insider with no life beyond SW1A thought Alastair Campbell fronting it up would be a good idea? Within these elite circles there were some for whom their Europeanism was a handy for driving a wedge between Jeremy Corbyn and the remain sympathies of the Corbynist base. Some Labour MPs, some of them on the left, campaigned away for a second referendum or their remain and reform position, and others did so entirely cynically. How curious it is to find the party's deputy leader keeping the attrition of the cold coup (© @CatherineBuca) going with a sudden found enthusiasm not for a second referendum, but for a hard remain position. Nevertheless, renegades are gonna renege, and useful idiots will idiot, so perhaps the aftermath of that march was the point to stress the final say aspect of Labour's conference position. It would have looked like the party was bowing to popular pressure, and might even have offered some opportunities to not appear bloody minded about going for a deal first. Because we didn't, hard remain was allowed to fester in the party's ranks and support without a political answer. And, by accident and design, helped work that wedge in by opposing Labour to a final say, and effectively conniving with the Tory right and Nigel Farage to ensure Brexit is the only issue that matters.
The consequences of political actors can only go so far explaining the apparent disintegration of Labour's vote. Tom Watson does not have super powers. The other problem is the demobilisation of the vote. Corbynism is a movement that's most vital when it's in motion. 2015 and 2016 did the business of building and consolidating the base, and 2017 was its successful and audacious bid to hegemonise millions of people, which is what it did. But movements don't last forever, and mobilisation is never permanent. It settles down and life goes on until next time. Since the election, and despite the burst of creativity and activism around it, Corbynism in the main has settled into an abeyance of sorts. Despite attempts at pushing outwards into community organising, the support are mostly quiet and are spectators as parliamentary shenanigans and the endless anti-semitism scandal play out. Internal elections and mobilising for mandatory reselection in 2018, and upcoming selections will excite some members, but it's not the stuff out of which mass mobilisation is made. And without the coherence conferred by focus, collectives tend toward disaggregation and dispersal. Therefore Brexit politics, which lends itself to simple pro/anti- positioning, offers a point of attraction from the humdrum of commons manoeuvres and the dispiriting, energy sapping rumbling of racism.
It is difficult to see how this could have been avoided. The problem of political education is largely unaddressed, and while vitally necessary its impact on demobilisation would have mainly had party proper rather than periphery (voter) effects. Likewise, even if the narcissistic left had put the collective good before themselves, and not spent the last year baiting other lefts, we'd still be in the same position - albeit with a little less online rancour and not as much of a stain on the party's character. However, the core component of Corbynism - the activist membership - would be more united and, dare I say it, more cheerful, and better able to cope with these challenging circumstances.
However, politics moves quickly. If the Labour vote can apparently disintegrate in the face of a second order election, can it reassemble just as rapidly? Yes. The relationship between voters and parties are more transactional than was previously the case. The days of triangulating because your core has nowhere to go are done, and that applies just as much to the Tories as it does Labour. Once a general election is in play, other issues grow in salience, but while Brexit becomes one (albeit strong) issue among a handful of others, Labour's recovery is not a foregone conclusion. Yet neither is its failure.
This brings us back to the ostensible star of this piece. Oh Jeremy Corbyn, or woe Jeremy Corbyn? He's been written off more times than Boris Johnson's debts, but those who obsess over his flaws forget his appeal. Corbyn wasn't put at the top of the Labour Party twice and got more votes in 50 years than any Labour leader save Tony Blair in 1997 because of a cult-like following or messianic appeal, but because he personified a set of suppressed but attractive values, and had the policies to back them up. Despite the best efforts of his PLP and press enemies, that remains the case. And at the next general election, which is likely to be very dirty indeed, we will be reminded that Corbyn the campaigner is a very potent focal point for the movement that bears his name.
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